An introduction to the philosophy of religion

Caird John
AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

BY
JOHN CAIRD, D.D., LL.D.
PRINCIPAL AND VICE-CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW

Negligentia mihi videtur, si postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus
quod credimus intelligere.—ANSELM

New Edition

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PREFATORY NOTE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

The substance of this book was delivered in Edinburgh as the “Croall Lecture” for 1878-9. The author has not, however, deemed it necessary to retain in the following pages the form of lectures—a form which he has found to give rise to arbitrary divisions and interruptions of the continuity of thought.

In addition to the works referred to in the footnotes, the author desires to express his obligations to the following books:—Baur’s Christliche Gnosis and Dogmengeschichte; Pfleiderer’s Die Religion and Religionsphilosophie; Vera’s Preliminary Dissertations to the French Translation of Hegel’s Philosophie der Religion; Vatke’s Die Menschliche Freiheit; Wallace’s Logic of Hegel; Bradley’s Ethical Studies; Muir’s Sanskrit Texts; Prof. Max Müller’s Introduction to
PREFATORY NOTE.

the Science of Religion and other works; and, above all, Hegel’s Philosophie der Religion, a work to which he has been more largely indebted than to any other book.

University of Glasgow,
April, 1880.
CONTENTS.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
The Function of Philosophy—Demand for a Criticism of the Organ of Knowledge—Objections to the Competency of Reason in the province of Religion, . . . . . . Pages 1—6

CHAPTER I.

OBJECTIONS TO THE SCIENTIFIC TREATMENT OF RELIGION: FIRST OBJECTION, FROM THE RELATIVE CHARACTER OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

Alleged distinction of the provinces of Science and Religion—The Known and the Unknowable—The Relativity of Knowledge—Statement of Mr. H. Spencer’s views—Answers: 1. The two elements of his theory, that knowledge is relative and that we know the existence of the Absolute, irreconcilable—2. Logical conclusion from his theory, the non-existence of the Absolute—3. His theory based on a false abstraction—4. Worship of the Unknowable an impossible attitude of mind—What it implies, . . . 7—29

NOTE: Mr. Spencer’s “undefined consciousness of the Absolute,” 29—34

CHAPTER II.

SECOND OBJECTION, FROM THE IMMEDIATE OR INTUITIVE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE.

Statement of the objection—I. Examination of its sources—Reaction of pious feeling from rational thought—Answers: Not the aim of Philosophy to produce direct religious results—Contrast of Intuitive and Scientific Knowledge not peculiar to Religion—Intuitive
CONTENTS.

Knowledge not really Immediate—II. Validity of Intuition as basis of Certitude—Appeal to Consciousness not rejected by Philosophy—Immediate Knowledge only Empirical—Intuition not the only resource from Sensationalism and Empiricism, 35—58

CHAPTER III.

THIRD OBJECTION, FROM THE AUTHORITATIVE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE.

Revelation the necessary presupposition of Religion—Does not exclude the activity of Reason—False grounds of opposite view—Impossibility of the absolute opposition of Reason and Revelation—Examination of distinction between what is ‘contrary to Reason’ and what is ‘above Reason,’ 59—73

CHAPTER IV.

THE NECESSITY OF RELIGION.

What ‘the Necessity of Religion’ does not imply—It is not Necessity for the Individual—Nor of elements common to all Religions—Its true meaning—Proof of Necessity precluded by Materialistic Theories—Attempted Refutations of Materialism often turn on a false issue—I. Inadequacy of Materialistic Theories—Thought presupposed in that of which it is held to be the product—Force or Mechanical Casuation not a principle of universal application—Inapplicable to the Phenomena of Organisation—Still more to those of Thought or Self-Consciousness—II. Necessity of rising to the point of view of Religion—A potential Infinitude involved in the nature of Mind—What lies beyond Mind not a limit to it—Thought presupposes Absolute Intelligence or the Ultimate Unity of Knowing and Being, 74—124

CHAPTER V.

THE PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

Value of these Proofs as steps of the Process by which we rise to Knowledge of God—Their inadequacy as logical arguments—I. The Cosmological Argument, à contingentia mundi—Its real significance—Its logical value only negative—Transition to higher proof