The Operations Of War Explained And Illustrated

Hamley Edward Bruce
THE

OPERATIONS OF WAR

EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED

BY

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PREFACE.

The Author of this book may venture to think that it is held to be of value by his professional brethren, for, though former editions comprised among them many thousand copies, it is as much in demand as at first, which, in a volume of such size and cost, and of so technical a character, argues an enduring popularity. To the continuance of this the Author has always endeavoured to entitle it, by the most careful revision, with reference both to the changes in military art, and to the great contemporary wars which have occurred at about the time of the publication of each successive edition. The American Civil War, the Austrian War of 1866, the Franco-German War of 1870, have all in their turn furnished illustrations and subjects of comment: and, if much matter has not been derived from the campaigns in Turkey and Armenia, it is partly because the volume was already in great part printed while the operations were yet in progress, and more because the war afforded few examples of any but the most obvious facts, such as had already
received sufficient illustration. In the course of these wars he
has not unfrequently had the satisfaction of finding prognosti-
cations which were put forth in an earlier edition verified; an
instance in point has occurred in the campaign just concluded
in Armenia (note, p. 441); and a view expressed in a former
edition respecting a remarkable episode in the Franco-German
War was, some years later, confirmed by the highest foreign
authority (note, p. 332).

New matter which appears to the Author important will be
found in this edition, especially on the questions of Supply and
of Transport of Troops by Rail (Part I., Chap. III.); and on
points of Tactics (Part VI., Chaps. III., VI., VIII.) Many
considerations that will be found in these latter have occurred
to him in the course of the peculiar duties of his late command.
For many years he enjoyed, in this respect, an advantage which,
to the expositor of military operations, can hardly be overrated.
In accordance with the recommendation of a Royal Commission,
which came into operation when the Author became Commandant
of the Staff College in 1870, it has been a most important part of
his duty to direct the exercises of officers studying at the College,
on actual ground, and on a supposed plan of continuous oper-
tions, as if they were acting under a general in a campaign.
Every year a new tract of country was selected for the capa-
bilities it possessed of being turned in this way to good account,
and the details of the whole series of operations were carefully
worked out. It can hardly be doubted that such training was of
great consequence to our future staff; and the Author is well
satisfied to believe that such professional knowledge as he has
endeavoured to impart has reached the great body of his com-
rades, not merely through this volume, but through a large
number of highly intelligent officers who have studied their
business under him. He would be glad to think that this is
one among many causes of that increasing spread of professional
knowledge which renders him conscious of addressing now an
audience very different from the readers of his First Edition
twelve years ago.

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