Fichte's Science of knowledge. A critical exposition

Everett Charles Carroll
GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS

FOR

ENGLISH READERS AND STUDENTS.

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GEORGE S. MORRIS.

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FICHTE'S

SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION.

BY

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PREFACE.

In the prospectus of the series to which this volume belongs, the following statement was made:

"Each volume will be devoted to the critical exposition of some one masterpiece belonging to the history of German philosophy. The aim in each case will be to furnish a clear and attractive statement of the special substance and purport of the original author's argument, to interpret and elucidate the same by reference to the historic and acknowledged results of philosophic inquiry, to give an independent estimate of merits and deficiencies, and especially to show, as occasion may require, in what way German thought contains the natural complement, or the much needed corrective, of British speculation."

In accordance with this plan, the present volume will be chiefly devoted to a study of Fichte's Principles of the Complete Science of Knowledge.* Reference will be made to his other writings, sufficient, it is hoped, to show the relation which the results reached in this work bear to his system as a whole.

* Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre.
PREFACE.

It would be too much to say that no system of philosophy can be understood till it is believed. It is at least true, however, that no system can be understood until belief in it is seen to be possible. I shall, therefore, identify myself as closely as possible with the work before us, making the freest use of the material furnished by Fichte, and seeking to make its reasoning seem conclusive where that is possible; and plausible where plausibility is all that can be hoped. Criticism will not be introduced in the course of the discussion, except in cases where a process of thought may be better understood by its aid. A brief criticism will, however, be added at the close of the work, which may perhaps sufficiently indicate the limitations of Fichte's philosophy.

C. C. EVERETT.

Harvard University,
May, 1884.
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